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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING and W. R.
McENTIRE, Commissioners of the
Public Service· Commission of Utah,
and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,

Case
No. 7597

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision of
the Public Service Commission of Utah.
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In this brief parties to this proceeding may sometimes
be designated as follows: Petitioner, The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, as Rio Grande; respondent Public Service Commission of Utah as the Commission ; and respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company,
as Union Pacific.
Union Pacific conceived a plan to extend railroad industrial spur trackage into an area in Salt Lake City and
Salt Lake County, Utah. Under the plan Union Pacific proposed to construct such trackage southerly from Ninth
South Street in Salt Lake City along Third West Street
(and over private property where Third West Street had not
been opened) to Seventeenth South Street in Salt Lake
County (R. 1-7).
Between Ninth South Street and the north line of
Andrew Avenue, the proposed track would cross certain
east and west streets, intersecting Third West Street. At
the north line of Andrew Avenue the proposed track would
enter private property and extend over. private property
from that point to Seventeenth South Street (R. 1-7).
The private property proposed to be crossed between
Andrew Avenue and Seventeenth South Street embraces
a parcel of twenty acres owned by Geary Estates and Rio
Grande (R. 74). The ownership of Rio Grande consists
of its right of way, 150 feet wide, extending in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction, substantially bisecting the
parcel (R. 105-106, 118-119). The remainder of the parcel
is owned by Geary Estates (R. 74). At the angle of the
proposed Union Pacific crossing its trackage would extend
over Rio Grande right of way some 170 feet (R. 172).
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3
Rio Grande acquired the ownership of its right of way
at the point of proposed crossing from the Salt Lake and
Utah Railroad Corporation (R. 116, 118). Within this
right of way Rio Grande has two tracks, one which it
operates and maintains for the purpose of serving industries located in the area and for the purpose of interchanging traffic with the Bamberger Railroad Corporation, and
the other, an industry track, used by Rio Grande to serve
Western Salvage and Supply Company. The proposed track
of Union Pacific would cross said right of way of Rio
Grande and both of these tracks (R. 117, 127, 152).
A print showing Rio Grande's right of way and trackage at and near the point of Union Pacific's proposed crossing, the proposed track of Union Pacific, and adjacent
streets and properties is attached to this brief as Appen ..
dix A.

On February 2, 1950, Union Pacific in furtherance of
such plan filed its application before the Commission setting out its proposal and praying that:

* * * an order be issued authorizing the applicant to immediately commence the construction
of said industry track as hereinbefore referred to,
and that said order authorize applicant to construct
and operate said track across said Ninth South,
Thirteenth South and Fifteenth South Streets, and
across Paxton and Lucy A venues, and across the
spur and interchange tracks of the Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company and the Bamberger Railroad Company. Applicant further prays
that such order be made effective forthwith.
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The application came on regularly for hearing before
the Commission. Rio Grande appeared as a protestant. Evidence was introduced by both Union Pacific and Rio Grande.
As shown above, there is but one parcel of land lying
between Rio Grande's track and Seventeenth South Street.
This is the only parcel of land upon which industries might
locate and which could be served by Union Pacific after its
proposed crossing of the tracks of Rio Grande. Union
Pacific called as a witness to testify with respect to the indus trial development of this tract one N. J. Bowman, a real
estate broker. Mr. Bowman testified in substance that the
parcel (except for Rio Grande's right of way) was owned
by Geary Estates. He had been working on the industrial
development of the tract for about two years. Although inquiries had been received, no industry had decided to locate
upon this tract, and the development of any industry thereon
had only advanced to the inquiry stage. He had never con·
tacted Rio Grande with respect to providing trackage to
any industry upon the parcel, although the presently existing line of the Rio Grande substantially bisected the entire
tract (R. 84, 105, 112).
The matter was taken under advisement by the Com·
mission and under date of August 2, 1950, it issued its
report and order whereby the application of Union Pacific
was approved and permission granted Union Pacific to
construct, operate and maintain a standard. gauge railroad
spur track over and across the streets in said order
designated and the property and tracks of Rio Grande. The
order further provided that Union Pacific should provide,
at its expense, proper interlocking safety devices at the
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point where such trackage shall cross the tracks of Rio
Grande (R. 19-27).
Union Pacific has not acquired any easement or right
of way over the property or tracks of Rio Grande and has
in no manner compensated Rio Grande for the proposed
use of this property ( R. 30) .
On August 17, 1950, Rio Grande filed its application
for rehearing, specifying the grounds upon which it considered the order and decision of the Commission to be
unlawful, alleging in substance that
( 1) In granting the application of Union
Pacific for authori~y to construct and maintain its
track across the property and tracks of Rio Grande
the Commission acted in excess of and without jurisdiction, and the granting of such authority would
authorize the taking of the property of Rio Grande
without compensation, in violation of the provisions
of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the
United States;
(2) The Commission failed regularly to pursue the authority conferred upon it by statute in
requiring the installation of interlocking safety devices without making provision for the operation,
maintenance, use and protection of such facilities ;
and
(3) There is no substantial evidence that any
industry which may locate southerly of the tracks
of Rio Grande could not adequately, conveniently
and efficiently be served by Rio Grande and no sub-
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stantial evidence that public convenience and necessity require the crossing of its tracks (R. 29-31).
On September 6, 1950, the Commission denied Rio
Grande's application for rehearing.
On October 5, 1950, Rio Grande filed in this Court its
petition for a writ of review, pursuant to which a writ
was issued by this Court, and the proceedings before the
Commission are now here pursuant to such writ.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON

I.
THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
AUTHORIZE UNION PACIFIC TO CONSTRUCT,
OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A TRACK OVER THE
RIGHT OF WAY AND TRACKS OF RIO GRANDE.
II.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION VIOLATES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF RIO GRANDE
THAT ITS PROPERTY MAY NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
III.
THE COMMISSION FAILED REGULARLY TO
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING THE JN..
STALLATION OF INTERLOCKING SAFETY DE..
VICES WITHOUT MAKING PROVISION FOR THE
OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, USE AND PROTECTION OF THE SAME.
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IV.
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSIT·Y REQUIRE UNION PACIFIC TRACKAGE BEYOND THE
POINT OF THE PROPOSED RIO GRANDE CROSSING.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
AUTHORIZE UNION PACIFIC TO CONSTRUCT,
OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A TRACK OVER THE
RIGHT OF WAY AND TRACKS OF RIO GRANDE.

An understanding of the issues presented in this proceeding requires an examination of the nature of the authority sought by Union Pacific in its application before the
Commission.
A reading of this application shows that the authority sought by Union Pacific falls into two distinct classifications, viz: (a) authority to cross a public street, and
(b) authority to cross. the private property of Rio Grande.
In connection with the crossing of a public street by
a railroad, no question as to the taking .or use of private
property is involved. The interested parties in such a
proceeding are the applicant railroad company and the
public which enjoys the use of the street proposed to be
crossed.
Exclusive jurisdiction over public crossings is vested
in the Commission by the express provisions of Section
76-4-15, U. C. A. 1943.
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This Court has had occasion in several cases to consider the nature of the jurisdiction of the· Commission over
public crossings and the rule is now firmly established in
this State that this jurisdiction is full and complete.

Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 51 U. 623, 172 P. 479;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 U. 186, 134 P. (2d) 469;
Provo City v. Department of Business Regulrution et al., 218 P. (2d) 675.
No issue is raised or presented in this proceeding relating to the public crossing phase of the Commission's
order and that matter may be laid at rest.
Union Pacific in its application and the Commission
in its order granting the same treat the public street crossings and the Rio Grande crossing as being in the same category and a subject upon which the Commission might make
an order of identical force and effect. In failing to distinguish the essential differences in the crossings involved,
the Commission, we believe, clearly exceeded its jurisdiction.
In this connection it should be borne in mind that
Union Pacific did not propose to cross the tracks of Rio
Grande within the limits of any street, but rather such
crossing was proposed entirely over private property. On
either side of the proposed crossing are premises owned
by Geary Estates, through which property Rio Grande owns
a 150 feet wide right of way. We have, then, squarely presented the question of the jurisdiction of the Commission
in connection with the crossing of one railroad over the
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private property and tracks of another. In order to ascertain the jurisdiction of the Commission in such connection,
we believe an examination of certain statutes is essential.
We turn first to the chapter on eminent domain. Section 104-61-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides that, subject to the
provisions of that chapter, the right of eminent domain may
be exercised in behalf of the public uses therein specified,
one of the public uses being for railroads.
Section 104-61-3, U. C. A. 1943, provides in part as
follows:
The private property which may be taken under
this chapter includes :

*

*

*

*

*

( 5) All rights of way for any and all purposes
mentioned in section 104-61-1, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands
held or used in ·connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed or intersected by
any other right of way or improvement or structure
thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited use
in common with the owners thereof, when necessary;
but such uses of crossings, intersections and connections shall be made in the manner most compatible
with the greatest public benefit and the least private
injury.
The above statute, so far as we are able to determine,
appears first as Section 3843 of the Complied Laws of
Utah, 1888, and has not been substantially amended since
that time. This court has had occasion to construe the above
provisions in several cases, and the proposition is now established that, within limitations which have been prescribed
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in these cases, a corporation enjoying the power of eminent
domain may take for a public use the property of another
upon payment of just compensation.

Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 23 U. 47 4, 65 P. 735;
Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc.,
83 U. 545, 31 P. (2d) 624;
Monetaire Min. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol.
Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172;
Freeman Gulch Min. Co. v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 119 F. (2d) 16.
The Public Utilities Act was brought into our law by
Chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1917. Section 14 of Article IV
of that Act deals with the subject of the regulation of
grade crossings and confers upon the Commission substantially the pow-er now found in Section 76-4-15, U. C. A.
1943. Section 34 ·of Article V of the original Act provides
that "all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." The inquiry then
arises as to whether the eminent domain provisions above
set forth are repealed by the provisions of said Section 14
of the Public Utilities Act. We believe it clear that they
were not so repealed, and an examination of the present
Section 76-4-15 will so demonstrate.
.Section 76-4-15, which confers upon the Commission
the power which it undertook to exercise in connection with Union Pacific's application provides as follows:
( 1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, highway or street at
grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation
be constructed across the track of any other railroad
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or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the
track of a street railroad corporation be constructed
across the track of a railroad corporation at grade,
without the permission of the commission having
first been secured; provided, that this subsection
shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully existing tracks. The commission shall have the right to
refuse its permission or to grant it upon such terms
and conditions as it may prescribe~
(2) The Commission shall have the ~xclusive
power to determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the
terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use
and protection of each crossing of one railroad by
another railroad or street railroad, and of a street
railroad by a railroad and of each crossing of a
public road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and
to alter or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the
use of such crossings to certain types of traffic in
the interest of public safety and is. vested with power
and it shall be its duty to designate the railroad
crossings to be traversed by school busses and motor
vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require,
where in its judgment it would be practicable, a
separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the
terms upon which such separation shall be made and
the proportions in which the expense of the alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation
of such grades shall be divided between the railroad
or street railroad corporations. affected, or between
such corporations and the state, county, municipality
or other public authority in interest.
(3) Whenever the commission shall find that
public convenience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of
a street or highway over, under or upon the tracks
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or lines of any public utility, the commission may by
order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and
such crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and crossing.
We are here concerned with subsections (1) and (2)
of the above section. Considering first subsection (1),
that section, it seems to us, is in the nature of a prohibition.
It does not empower the Commission to grant one railroad
authority to cross another but imposes as· a condition to
such crossing the permission of the Commission. In other
·words, it is necessary, in order to accomplish such a crossing, that the Commission give its consent, but the giving
of a consent, in and of itself, does not enable one railroad
to cross another.
In examining subsection (2) we find the actual jurisdiction of the Commission. The first clause of that subsection to us is persuasive. It confers upon the Commission
exclusive power to do certain things, namely, to prescribe
the manner, including the particular point of crossing and
the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and
protection of each crossing of one railroad by another. Now here in this section does the Legislature confer upon the
··Commission authority to grant one railroad the right to
cross the right of way, property, or tracks of another. That
right must come from another source and that source is,
we think, clearly either from voluntary grant or conveyance
or by exercise of the power of eminent domain under the
provisions of Section 104-61-3, supra. This being so, jurisdiction is, we think, in these matters now clearly divided as
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follows: The Commission, under said Section 76-4-15, has
the power to determine and prescribe the point at which
one railroad may cross another at grade and the terms
of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection
of such crossing. The courts have the power under said
Chapter 61 over the acquisition of the necessary property
rights and the compensation which must be paid for these
rights in connection with any such crossing.
A brief exploration into the field of eminent domain
will demonstrate the underlying reason behind the division
of jurisdiction between the courts and the Commission respecting the crossing by one railroad of the property and
tracks of another. In the construction of its line, a railroad
corporation enjoys for ordinary purposes the right of the
determination of the location and route which its tracks
will take.
1 Lewis Eminent Domain ( 3rd Ed.), Section
390;
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., supra.
This right of location is essential to the practical construction of a railroad, otherwise the builders of a railroad
passing through numerous parcels of privately owned land
would have no means of effectively controlling the location
of their trackage. When it is proposed, however, that one
railroad shall be constructed over the property and trackage of another, problems of an entirely different character
are presented. These problems relate to matters of public
safety, public convenience and necessity, and physical
operations of the railroads involved. Consequently the
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Legislature· saw fit in the crossing of one railroad by another to withdraw from the constructing line the power
of location of route which it would otherwise enjoy and
to vest that power in the Commission.
The location of route· may be a factor which will influence the amount of compensation which a railroad may
be required to pay when it crosses the, property of a land
owner or the property of another railroad, but location of
route is a matter wholly distinct from the judicial problem
of determining the compensation to be paid for the taking
of the property employed. It thus appears clear that the
function and jurisdiction of the Commission in cases such
as here presented is very limited and restricted. It relates
only to the determination of the point at which crossing may
be made and the conditions which may be imposed in connection with the installation of safety devices at the crossing. Matters in connection with acquisition of property and
the payment of compensation rest, where they have always
rested, in the courts.
The sol uti on of the problem here presented is, we believe, readily found in a careful examination of the controlling statutes alone. We have found no case in which
this Court has construed Section 76-4-15 in relation to the
issues raised on this review. The decision in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., supra, is,
however, in point. In that case it appears that Congress
enacted a measure to aid in the construction of telegraph
lines. Under the provisions of the Act corporations organized for the purpose of transmitting messages and conducting a telegraph business, upon acceptance of the pro-
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visions of the Act, were given the right to erect their lines
upon post roads. Railroads were made post roads by the
further provisions of the Act. The telegraph company had
duly accepted the provisions of the Act, and the Postmaster
General had executed a certificate to this effect. The court
points out that the Act is auxiliary to state law and compliance with the Act qualifies the telegraph company to exercise
the power to acquire its necessary easements by eminent
domain, saying in part:

* * * By accepting the provisions of this
act, respondent is given the right to erect its telegraph lines upon all post roads; and by section 3964
of the Revised Statutes of the United States all railroads are made post roads. But, before respondent
can exercise the right thus granted by congress, it
must have fixed and paid to the appellant just compensation for the easement. This is ascertained by
resorting to the state law relative to eminent domain. The state law becomes auxiliary to the act
of congress, and provides the method of condemnation and compensation. In other words, a right is
given by this act of congress, and the remedy is furnished by the laws of the state.
In princi pie the situation is no different here. The
Public Utilities Act is auxiliary to the eminent domain
chapter. In the matter of the crossing proposed by Union
Pacific, the orde,r of the Commission affords Union Pacific
a clearance which may enable it to then proceed to undertake the acquisition of the necessary property rights.
The Commission is an administrative body, clothed
by the Legislature with the power to regulate public utilities of the State.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Utah Copper Co. v. Publie Utilities Commission
of Utah et al., 59 U. 191, 203 P. 627.
The Commission's jurisdiction under Section 76-4-15
is incident to that power of regulation. The taking of
property under the power of eminent domain is a judicial
function, protected by all those carefully enacted and preserved safeguards which time and experience have found to
be essential in connection with the taking of private property for a public use. Even if the Legislature had the constitutional power to do so, there is nothing in the statutes
involved to indicate an intention to clothe the Commission
with such a .judicial function.
The Commission in its order makes no distinction between its general jurisdiction over public crossings and its
very limited jurisdiction over the private crossing proposed.
By the very broad language of its general order, the Commission undertook to grant the prayer of the Union Pacific
application in its entirety and without restriction, thereby
purporting to clothe Union Pacific with authority to enter
upon, take and use the private property of Rio Grande. In
so doing the Commission acted unlawfully and exceeded the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law.
II.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION VIOLATES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF RIO GRANDE
THAT ITS PROPERTY MAY NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
Consideration of this point requires an examination of
the application of Union Pacific filed before the Commis-
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sion, the order sought by the prayer of this application,
and the effect of the Commission's order in granting the
application.
In paragraph 7 of its application, Union Pacific
describes the center line of its proposed track. The final
paragraph of that description delineates the track from the
north line of Andrew Avenue to Seventeenth South Street
as follows:
From the north line of Andrew Avenue .the
center line of said proposed track as it extends
southerly will leave the limits of Salt Lake City,
and between said point and Seventeenth South Street
the same will be constructed over and upon private
land and right of way therefor will be granted to
applicant by private owners. However, in the vicinity of Van Buren Avenue said trackage as projected
will cross a spur track and interchange track owned
by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, as shown by the print attached hereto.
This paragraph indicates that Union Pacific intended
to acquire by grant its right of way over the property of
Geary Estates but evidences no such intention with respect
to acquiring an easement across the property of Rio Grande,
although, as we have pointed out, Union Pacific would not
only cross two tracks within Rio Grande's right of way but
would extend its proposed track some one hundred seventy
feet within the limits of such right of way.
Union Pacific prays for an order authorizing it to
immediately commence the construction of the track and to
construct and operate the same over the streets designated
and the property of Rio Grande and that such order be made
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effective forthwith. It seems unreasonable to doubt that
Union Pacific intended that the force and effect of the
proposed order would empower it immediately to lay its
tracks across the public streets involved and over and across
the property and tracks of Rio Grande. The Commission
orders that

* * * the application of Union Pacific Railroad Company for permission to construct, operate
and maintain a standard gauge railroad spur track
* * * is hereby approved and granted.
No limitations or restrictions upon the prayer of the
application are here imposed. The further order of the
Commission requires the installation of safety devices but
does not otherwise restrict the authority or right of Union
Pacific.
We have here, then, a case in which the Commission has
granted Union Pacific the right immediately to construct
and operate a track over the privately owned right of way,
tracks and property of Rio Grande, with no suggestion whatever that Rio Grande should or might be entitled in any
manner to compensation for the taking of its. property.
That Rio Grande has neither granted any right or easement
to Union Pacific nor in any manner received compensation
from Union Pacific is not in dispute.
To further urge upon this Court the argument that
the Commission's order would enable Union Pacific to take
without compensation the property of Rio Grande, in violation of the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions,
is to labor a point we think wholly unnecessary.
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III.
THE COMMISSION FAILED REGULARLY TO
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING THE INSTALLATION OF INTERLOCKING SAFETY DEVICES WITHOUT MAKING PROVISION FOR THE
OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, USE AND PROTECTION OF THE SAME.
A consideration of this point requires a further examination of Section 76-4-15. As our previous discussion
has shown, the Commission is by this section vested with
exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters.
One subject over which the Commission enjoys exclusive jurisdiction is the facilities incident to railroad
crossings. The essential language of the statute relating to
that subject is as follows :
The Commission shall have the exclusive power
to determine and prescribe the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of
each crossing of one railroad by another railroad.
From the foregoing language it is seen that the terms
which the Commission is empowered to prescribe relate to
installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection.
An analysis of this language shows that each of these terms
is related to the other and that the duty of the Commission
is to prescribe with respect to all of these terms in their
entirety and not to each separately; otherwise the language
of the statute would have been installation, operation,
mainte·nance, use or protection.
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The facilities at crossings with which the Commission
is essentially concerned are safety devices. The Commission, in connection with the Union Pacific application, assumed jurisdiction with respect to the subject of safety
devices, and a portion of its order relates to such devices.
This subject, being within the jurisdiction of the Commission, its order cannot be disturbed by this Court unless the
Commission failed regularly to pursue its authority or its
order is capricious or arbitrary.

Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah,
6'7 U. 222, ·247 P. 2:84.

.

The order of the Commission on this matter is in substance that Union Pacific shall provide, at its expense,
proper interlocking safety devices at the point of its proposed crossing with Rio Grande. In requiring that Union
Pacific provide the devices, the Commission has required
Union Pacific in effect to install and supply the same and
has accordingly dealt with the first term of the language
of the statute quoted above, namely, installation. The
Commission has. in no manner, however, dealt with the
other terms of the statute with respect to such devices,
namely, operation, maintenance, use and protection.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the installation of inter locking safety devices is but the first and in
many ways the least important phase· of their entire operation. These devices require the constant employment of
energy, man power and technical skill in connection with
their operation. They need constant and careful maintenance and repair, and the entire facility must be carefully
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preserved and protected. Furthermore the use of such facilities requires an order of a regulatory body or agreement
with respect to priority of movement of trains and cars
over the crossing and division of expense and charges in
connection with the entire facility. To prescribe the terms
of installation of such devices, with no provision whatever
for operation, maintenance, use and protection, is to force
the parties into a relationship which can only lead to uncertainty, confusion and expense.
Judicial experience through the years has developed
the sound principle that if a judicial body or tribunal assumes jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action or
proceeding, it should extend its inquiry and jurisdiction to
afford complete relief to the parties. This is such a fundamental proposition that no citation in support thereof is
necessary.
It may be suggested in defense of the order of the
Commission that, if the same be otherwise lawful, it should
be sustained, and if the railroads involved cannot, after installation of the safety devices, agree with respect to the
matters of operation, maintenance, use and. protection of the
same, that a further application may be made to this Commission to determine the division of expense with respect to
these matters. Such a suggestion, in our opinion, only
serves more clearly to demonstrate the impropriety of the
Commission's order. Obviously the Commission should not
exercise its jurisdiction piecemeal. At the outset the Commission should determine and make an appropriate order
with respect to all matters and issues which may be necessary to afford the interested parties complete and proper

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
relief. Any party deeming itself aggrieved by such an
order can then have a full and adequate review of the proceedings of the Commission. Certainly neither of the Railroads here involved can now know what terms or conditions
might be imposed at a future date by the Commission in
connection with the proposed crossing; and to allow the
crossing to be· made and one of the parties to install the
crossing facilities without knowing what may be the rights
and duties of the parties with respect to operation, maintenance, use and protection is only to invite future controversy.
Rio Grande endeavored in good faith in its petition for
rehearing in the case before the Commission to have the
Commission fully and properly fix and determine all of the
rights and duties of the two roads incident to the required
safety devices. In failing to properly and completely deal
with this subject in its order and in denying Rio Grande's
petition for rehearing when the matter was specifically
called to the attention of the Commission, it failed regularly
to pursue its authority and its orders are arbitrary and
capricious.
IV.
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY RE·
QUIRE UNION PACIFIC TRACKAGE BEYOND THE
POINT OF THE PROPOSED RIO GRANDE CROSSING.
If a decision of the Commission is supported by sub·
stantial evidence, then, under the aut:Q.ority of numerous
decisions of. this Court, such decision will not be· disturbed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

upon review. Equally well established, however, is the
proposition that if a decision of the Commission is not
supported by substantial evidence it will be set aside.

Utah Copper c~o. v. Public Utilities Commission
of Utah et al., 59 U. 191, 203 P. 627;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 U. 459', 135 P. (2d) 915;
McCarthy et al. v. Public Service Commission
et al., 111 U. 489, 184 P. (2d) 220.
In its application before the Commission Union Pacific
sought authority to cross certain streets and the tracks of
Rio Grande for the purpose of extending its trackage from
Ninth South Street to Seventeenth South Street. There
was in the application no proposal to extend trackage beyond the north line of Seventeenth South Street. In order
to do so it would have been necessary for Union Pacific to
seek authority from the Commission to cross Seventeenth
South Street. This it did not do, and the Commission restricted the application to a consideration of the extension
of trackage from Ninth South Street to the north line of
Seventeenth South Street (R. 72, 78).
The Commission in its report (R. 22) found in part
that:

* * *

applicant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, has been requested by various property owners and by companies and concerns having industrial
property along Third West Street and south of Ninth
South Street in Salt Lake 'City to extend industrial
track to such area to serve such industries as are
located in that area and to serve additional industries which are in contemplation of construction and
location within said area.
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That applicant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, heretofore made application to the Salt Lake
City Commission and under date of November 1,
19·49, was granted a franchise by the Salt Lake City
·Commission giving to it authority to construct, operate and maintain trackage longitudinally along
said Third West Street in Salt Lake City, Utah from
Ninth South southerly to Andrew Avenue south of
Fifteenth South Street in Salt Lake City, at which
point said trackage will leave the limits of Salt Lake
City and extend along private property outside of
the City limits to the northern boundary of Seventeenth South Street. A copy of said ordinance was
submitted as Exhibit I at the time of the hearing
upon said application and is on file with the Commi~
sion and made a part hereof by reference.
That because of requests that have been made
of applicant, Union Pacific Railroad ~Company, by
property owners in said area and because of rapid
industrial growth in said area, both with respect to
industries. located there and others ·projected for
early construction, the convenience and necessity of
the public generally, and of business and industry
located and to be located in said area require the
immediate construction of said industry trackage;
that the granting of the application will not be detrimental to the best interests of the public but will
tend to serve its interests better.
Witnesses were called by Union Pacific, testifying with
respect to the need: of railroad trackage between Ninth
South. Street and the north line of Rio Grande's right of
way. The testimony of all these witnesses. may be placed
to one side in connection with the inquiry under the above
designated point. So far as Rio Gran de is concerned, Union
Pacific may extend: its trackage all the way from Ninth
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South Street to the north line of Rio Grande's right of way.
We are here concerned only with whether public convenience
and necessity was shown by the evidence to require the
extension of Union Pacific trackage south of Rio Grande's
right of way.
Southerly of Rio Grande's right of way and northerly
of Seventeenth South Street, there is but one parcel of
land, being the south half of the Geary Estates property.
This parcel is bounded along its northerly line by the right
of way and trackage of Rio Grande. The only pertinent
testimony introduced by Union Pacific with respect to the
development of this parcel came from the real estate. broker
Bowman. The substance of his testimony as heretofore
pointed out is that he had been working upon the industrial
development of the tract for some two years, that inquiries
were presently being invited from industries. desiring to
locate on this parcel. At the time of his testimony no industry had yet determined to locate thereon, the development of the parcel being in the inquiry stage. He. knew of
the location of Rio Grande trackage abutting upon the
parcel but no contact had ever been made by him with Rio
Grande looking to the furnishing of trackage facilities to
any industry. Wholly without regard to the testimony of
the witness Bradford respecting the solicitation by Rio
Grande to locate industries along its trackage (R. 133-134),
how can it be found from the testimony of Union Pacific
that public convenience and necessity require the extension
of Union Pacific trackage over the tracks and right of way
of Rio Grande and into the south half of the Geary Estates
property?
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The contention may be made here that the Commission
was entitled to look beyond_ the scope of the Union Pacific
application into an area south of Seventeenth South Street
in connection with the crossing of.· Rio Grande's right of
way and tracks. If such contention were made, the answer
is found in the proceedings here under review. At the outset Rio Grande raised the question as to the scope of the
application. Union Pacific was then afforded an opportunity to amend and republish, had it seen fit to do so. It
elected, however, to proceed under its application as filed
(R. 70~72)., and the Commission, as above indicated, properly restricted the scope of the application. It is this application so restricted and the proceedings taken thereunder
which are here for review. ·Whatever Union Pacific may
do or intend to do south of the north line of Seventeenth
South Street is outside the scope of this review and should
not be here considered or drawn upon to support the order
and decision of the Commission in this case.

CONCLUSION.
In approving the application of Union Pacific and in
granting the authority there sought, the Commission failed
to observe the boundaries of· its jurisdiction. It undertook
to exercise an identical authority with respect to public
crossings of streets and the private crossing of one railroad
over the property and tracks of · another. Its jurisdiction
over the private crossing involved is restricted to fixing
the point of crossing and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of the crossing facilities. In undertaking to empower Union Pacific immediately
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to commence the construction of the proposed track and to
construct and maintain the same over the tracks and property of Rio Grande, the Commission attempted to exercise
the judicial function of ·granting to Union Pacific rights in
the property of Rio Grande and exceeded the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by law.
The Commission's order would enable Union Pacific
to enter upon, use and occupy the property of Rio Grande
without compensation, in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of
the United States.
The Commission properly assumed jurisdiction of the
matter of crossing facilities, but in requiring the installation
of safety devices without making any provision for the
operation, maintenance, use and protection of the same, it
left the parties in doubt and uncertainty as to the rights
and duties of each, and the cost and expense which each
might be required to bear and thereby failed reguarly to
pursue its authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
This review relates to the application of Union Pacific
to extend its trackage in Third West Street from Ninth
South to the north line of Seventeenth South Street, but
we are here concerned only with the crossing of Rio Grande's
tracks and right of way and the serving of the area southerly
of Rio Grande's right of way and northerly of Seventeenth
South Street. Within this area there is but one parcel of
land, bounded on its north line entirely by the right of way
and trackage of Rio Grande. There is no substantial evidence in the record that any public convenience and neces-
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sity require the proposed Rio Grande crossing to serve an~
industry which may locate upon this small parcel of landThe order and decision of the Commission should b$
set aside.

Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
LEONARD J. LEWIS,
Attorneys for P etitionerl.
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